Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments

I Introduction
The growth of international trade in goods that are not manufactured in a single country has brought into prominence the rules for determining the "origin" of traded products. Governments apply rules to determine the origin of products for two broad reasons. First, to distinguish foreign from domestic products, when imports are not to be granted national treatment. Second, to define the foreign origin of a product and the conditions under which it will be considered as originating in a preference receiving country (hence "preferential" rules). But rules of origin (ROOs) also have wider usage.
They play a role in the application of laws relating to marking, labeling, and advertising; duty drawback provisions; government procurement; countervailing duty and safeguard proceedings; and quantitative restrictions, including import prohibitions and trade embargoes.
Where two or more countries have been involved in the manufacture of a product, the general concept applied in formulating ROOs is that the product has origin where the last "substantial transformation" took place 1 . In practice there are three main methods of determining whether substantial transformation has occurred:
(1) The Value Added Test: which requires that the last production process has created a certain percentage of value added 2 ;
(2) Change in Tariff Heading Test: which confers origin if the activity in the exporting country results in a product that is classified under a different heading of the customs tariff classification than its intermediate inputs 3 ; and 1 See Vermulst (1992) and Vermulst et.al. (1994) for a discussion of ROOs and their applications in the major developed trading economies from a legal perspective. Falvey and Reed (1997) consider their economic effects. 2 Application of this test requires an analysis of production costs and generally takes one or more of three forms: (a) a maximum allowable percentage of imported parts and materials; (b) a minimum percentage of local value-added; or (c) a minimum percentage of originating parts relative to the total value of parts. There are many variations between countries in the way this test is applied, and the same facts can lead to different origin determinations in different countries. Indeed there can be variations even within a country, depending on the objective of the law it is intended to implement.
(3) Technical Test: which sets out certain production activities that may (positive test) or may not (negative test) confer originating status 4 .
These tests can be applied singly or in combination, and administrative agencies may depart from these methods when origin is to be determined for reasons other than customs clearance (e.g. antidumping). The upshot is an international regime where governments have considerable discretion in setting ROOs, particularly preferential
ROOs.
The interest of economists in ROOs is relatively recent, and has been prompted by the falling importance of MFN tariffs, their replacement by other (discriminatory)
interventions, and the expansion of preferential trading arrangements. It has been argued that the manner in which ROOs are defined and applied within these arrangements will play a significant role in determining the protection that they confer and the degree to which trade is distorted as a consequence 5 . The economic analysis of ROOs has been relatively limited, however, particularly analysis within formal models.
Partly this reflects a view that they have been relatively unimportant, partly it reflects the complexity of the structures required for their analysis, particularly in a general equilibrium context.
Much of the formal analysis has been concerned with content protection, investigating the effects of host government requirements that foreign firms use a certain proportion (measured by quantity or value) of host country inputs in their output in order for it to be sold on the host market. In outline the remainder of this paper is as follows. The next section sets up the model and derives the optimal uniform and discriminatory tariffs. Section III then analyses the welfare effects of imposing a (just) binding ROO, both with and without tariffs. The final section presents our conclusions.
II
Optimal Tariffs
II.1 Competitive Exporters
Consider the market for a homogeneous final commodity in which there are three participants -the "home" country which is a pure importer of the product and whose inverse demand function is r(Q), where r denotes the consumer price of the product and Q is total consumption; and two pure exporters -countries 1 and 2. Units are chosen so that production of each unit of this product requires one unit of value added intermediates to produce a final good which is then sold to the home country.
The free trade equilibrium conditions in this competitive market can be written as:
x 1 +x 2 = q 1 +q 2 = Q (1C)
Equations (1A) and (1B) require that the competitive producers of the final product purchase inputs from the cheapest source, so that prices of inputs from the two sources are equated; (1C) is a materials balance equation; and (1D) equates consumer price with average cost (ac) which the price taking producers also assume to be their marginal cost. Consumer surplus in the importing country is
where
Since the importing country has monopsony power in this market, it can improve its welfare by taxing imports. We first investigate the optimal uniform tariff, and then consider the possibility of imposing discriminatory taxes. Let t denote a uniform specific tariff. Aggregate home welfare from this market then becomes
Using (1A)- (1C) we can solve for
we can solve for
, and ac = .
Substituting in (3) allows us to solve for 8 In the remainder of the paper a ′ denotes a first derivative.
so that the (implicit) formula for the optimum uniform specific tariff ( t c ) in this instance is given by
In order to interpret this expression, note that the total cost of producing Q in the competitive market is T(Q) = ac(Q).Q from which the corresponding marginal cost is
Thus the last term in this expression, which is the optimum uniform tariff formula, denotes the difference between the marginal cost and the average cost of imports to the importing country, implying that the optimal tax is set so as to equate consumer price with marginal cost.
While a uniform tariff raises welfare, the fact that the final product is purchased from two different sources with different supply elasticities suggests further gains if tariffs are made discriminatory. Let t j denote the tariff levied on the final product from source j. Importing country benefits from this market then become
and the welfare effects of a change in the taxes are given (in total derivative form) as
Now the price equals average cost condition (5) must be rewritten as two separate
which, once differentiated, yield a system
where which allows us to solve for the optimal discriminatory tariffs ( t j c ) as
Recalling that t c = Q.
[
1 2 ], we have
Three points, in particular, are worth noting about these results. First, the (marginal share weighted) average tariff conforms to the same implicit formula as the optimum uniform tariff. In this sense the "average level of tax" is the same under the uniform and discriminatory tariff regimes. Second, the difference between the two discriminatory tariffs takes into account differences in value added elasticities only. The more price inelastic of the two value addeds faces the higher tariff 9 . Again this expression can be interpreted in terms of the difference between marginal and average costs. The average cost of value added from source j is v j , while its marginal cost is ε ε a potential role for policies which are able to distinguish the products on the basis of the origin of the intermediates embodied within them.
II.2 An Export Monopoly
We now reconsider the above for the case where the importing country faces an export monopolist. This profit maximising monopolist is assumed to purchase intermediates and value addeds from the two sources, although it would not matter if the monopolist was directly involved in production of these inputs given that v j (q j ) and p j (x j ) are cost functions, and in equilibrium equates the marginal costs of intermediates (mp j ) and value addeds (mv j ) from the two sources, and then overall marginal cost with marginal revenue (mr). The equilibrium conditions are now
mv 1 (q 1 ) = mv 2 (q 2 ) = mv(Q) (12B)
x 1 +x 2 = q 1 +q 2 = Q (12C)
; . . 0 0 0 and . We can use these equations to solve for the optimal uniform and discriminatory taxes in an identical fashion to the competitive case.
Equations ( and mr r Q r ′ = ′ + ′′ < 2 0 .
. The implicit formula for the optimal tariff ( t m ) can then be derived as
This formula can be interpreted in an analagous fashion to the competitive case. One difference is that it is now possible for the optimal intervention to be an import subsidy.
A necessary condition for this is that the marginal revenue curve be "flatter" than the demand curve (i.e. 0 > mr′ > r′) 11 . Since this issue is tangential to our purpose, we restrict attention to cases where t m > 0. Again, the optimal uniform tariff is set so that the domestic consumer price equals the marginal cost of imports to the importing country.
To solve for the optimal differential taxes we must now write (13) as
which allows us to proceed as before yielding:
So that ∆t mv q mv q = ′ − ′ 
Exactly the same comments can be made concerning these results as for those in the competitive market.
II.3 Linear Example:
The results so far can be illustrated using linear functions. Let The outputs in the two cases are then shown in Table 1. 11 See Brander and Spencer (1984) . . ; . 
Discriminatory Taxes Discriminatory Taxes
Note that the optimal discriminatory taxes in the competitive case adjust the valueadded mix to that which would be chosen by an export monopolist, for any given level of output. But the level of output with these taxes and competitive suppliers is in fact greater than that chosen by the monopolist in free trade.
III Rules of Origin
III.1 Competitive Exporters
To this point the exact origin of the intermediates used by each of the competitive final goods suppliers has been of no consequence. Intermediates are supplied by competitive firms in the two countries, and final goods producers are simply price takers in the intermediate market. Our objective here is to determine if there are circumstances under which the imposition of a (just) binding constraint of this form could raise welfare in the importing country. To do this we need to restructure the model to incorporate a ROO constraint. We begin by considering the unconstrained value of θ in a competitive market, which will depend on the level of output and is therefore written as θ c (Q) = x 1 /q 1 . Note that θ c also measures the ratio of the average shares of these two inputs
] is the corresponding ratio of the marginal shares of the two goods in output.
12 Note that we impose the ROO as a binding constriaint and do not give exporters the opportunity to accept or reject it. Output from either country that does not meet its relevant ROO is denied admittance to the home market. In practice where a product does not meet the origin criterion for its last location of production, origin will be given to another country in the case of nonpreferential ROOs or to no country where preferential agreements are concerned. See Vermulst (1992) The existence of a binding ROO (for which we impose the constraint as an equality) implies a changed structure of equilibrium conditions as follows:
x 1 + x 2 = q 1 + q 2 = Q (18C)
We can now use these conditions to determine the effects of tightening a ROO that is just on the verge of binding initially (i.e. where p 1 =p 2 ). We begin by examining its effects on the input mix at a given total output level. Using (18B) -(18D), and recalling p 1 =p 2 initially, allows us to solve for
. The implications of this "tightening" of the constraint for the average cost of producing the final good can then be determined using (18A) 
0 , which is the same as (17) the condition for the ratio x 1 /q 1 to rise as output rises in a competitive market. We conclude that if the ratio of these marginal shares exceeds the ratio of their average shares, imposing a (just) binding ROO of this form at the competitive equilibrium will reduce average cost and hence lead to an increase in aggregate output.
From (2) such an increase in output leads to a rise in the importing country's consumer surplus.
The key to understanding this outcome is to recognize that the competitive solution does not choose the combination of intermediate inputs and value addeds that minimizes total costs. Firms treat the price (average cost) of each input as its marginal cost, and select an input combination where the prices of inputs from the two sources are equated (i.e. p 1 =p 2 ,v 1 =v 2 ) rather than their marginal costs (mp 1 =mp 2 , mv 1 =mv 2 ).
The result is an equilibrium where the final good price equals average cost, but the latter is higher than necessary to produce this output. Imposing a binding ROO changes the input mix at both levels (for any given total output), increasing the share of x 1 in intermediates and reducing the share of q 1 in aggregate value added. If this rearrangement leads to a fall in average (and marginal) cost then output will rise, the consumer price will fall, and consumer surplus will increase as a consequence.
In the linear case the actual cost minimizing input combinations are the monopoly solutions for the corresponding outputs, so that from Table 1 input combinations differ by a constant whose sign is determined by the relative priceintercepts on the two sources. Thus if ∆p 0 > 0, intermediate input x 1 (x 2 ) is used less (more) than it should be to minimize total intermediate costs, while if ∆v 0 > 0, less (more) value added is being drawn from country 1 (2) than it should be to minimize total value added costs in the competitive equilibrium. Here
0 which is independent of the output level. A sufficient condition for the imposition of a just binding ROO to raise welfare is that ∆v 0 < 0 and ∆p 0 > 0, as then too much value added and too little intermediate are being drawn from source 1 relative to the cost minimizing combination. In these circumstances the ROO shifts the balance in a cost minimizing direction in both markets.
Where the importing country imposes a uniform import tariff the preceding analysis will continue to apply. The uniform tariff does not, in itself, compensate for the failure of the competitive market to choose the cost minimizing input mix. Hence imposing a (just) binding ROO, in addition to a uniform tariff, can be welfare improving under the same condition relating marginal and average shares.
Where the importing country imposes differential tariffs on imports "originating" from the two sources, the situation is slightly different. For one thing the presence of a ROO seems more natural since determining origin is important for determining which tax is to apply. Totally differentiating these equations with respect to q 1 , q 2 , and θ, we have system . θ .
This implies a fall in the cost of intermediates to the q 2 producer, and a change in the cost of intermediates to the q 1 producer of {θ
. In principle the latter may be positive or negative depending on whether θ is greater or less than ′ ′ p P 2 -i.e. on whether the initial (unconstrained) share of x 1 in intermediate use in the production of q 1 is greater or less than its marginal share in total intermediate output.
Clearly if the cost of intermediates to both producers falls, then total output increases, but the latter can happen even if the cost of intermediates to q 1 rises, as shown in (15) above.
We can solve this system for the changes in final outputs (and total output). Let B ≡ B 1 .B 2 -b 2 > 0 14 . Then after solving we find
To determine the welfare effects of these output changes at the optimal discriminatory tariffs, these solutions can be substituted in One can then show that
where the latter is as expected from (20) above. Substituting these in (11) and rearranging, we have finally
Thus whether imposing a (just) binding ROO will raise or reduce welfare when there are optimal discriminatory taxes on final outputs in place depends on whether the marginal share of x 1 in output ( ′ ′ p P 2 ) exceeds or is less than its average share In conventional terms, given the existence of discriminatory taxes, a preferential ROO would be imposed to determine output from the country subject to the smaller tax. The case considered above would fit this pattern if the country with the more elastic supply 15 The envelope theorem implies that the welfare effects of any adjustments in taxes will be second order small. 16 In the linear case, sign ).
III.2 Export Monopoly
The potential role of the ROO in reducing average costs in a competitive market should not carry over directly to a monopolised market. The monopolist chooses an input mix that minimises total (and average) costs for each level of output. Yet there remains scope for a ROO to affect marginal cost as we now demonstrate.
The existence of a binding ROO in the monopolised market implies an analagous change in the equilibrium conditions to:
x 1 + x 2 = q 1 + q 2 = Q (23C) A ROO will result in a welfare improvement under a uniform tax in the same circumstances. Where the importing country imposes differential tariffs on imports "originating" from the two sources, we can proceed analagously to the competitive case using the similarity of the structure to present the results without extensive derivation. Equations (21A) products to which these instruments will or will not be applied. Most economic analyses of ROOs has correspondingly taken place in frameworks involving a range of policies in which it is easy for the effects of the ROO to become obscured.
Our objective in this paper has been to examine the potential commercial policy effects of the ROO itself. Its distinguishing feature as a policy instrument is its ability to target the input composition of inputs, and we demonstrated circumstances under which its use could lead to an improvement in the importing country's terms of trade. In a competitive market this came about through the final goods exporters' inability to take account of the difference between average and marginal costs in purchasing their inputs. In a monopolised market, the exporter minimises total (and average) costs, but a ROO may reduce marginal costs. We also demonstrated that while their potential benefits occur through terms of trade effects, ROOs are complementary to rather than substitutes for tariffs on final outputs. When used in combination discriminatory tariffs can focus on differences in the elasticity of supply of value added while ROOs are targeted at the composition of intermediate inputs.
Finally, it is important to recall the qualifications that were made in the introduction.
Our aim here has been to deepen our understanding of the role of ROOs in economic models and analysis, not to suggest new and wider applications for them in practice.
Although the potential distortions created by ROOs have been recognised, they warrant greater analysis. Only when they are better understood can they be better regulated.
